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Repeated stimuli typically have shorter apparent duration than novel stimuli. Most
explanations for this effect have attributed it to the repeated stimuli being more
expected or predictable than the novel items, but an emerging body of work suggests
that repetition and expectation exert distinct effects on time perception. The present
experiment replicated a recent study in which the probability of repetition was varied
between blocks of trials. As in the previous work, the repetition effect was smaller
when repeats were common (and therefore more expected) than when they were rare.
These results add to growing evidence that, contrary to traditional accounts, expectation
increases apparent duration whereas repetition compresses subjective time, perhaps
via a low-level process like adaptation. These opposing processes can be seen as
instances of a more general “processing principle,” according to which subjective time
is a function of the perceptual strength of the stimulus representation, and therefore
depends on a confluence of “bottom-up” and “top-down” variables.
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INTRODUCTION
Stimulus repetition affects the perception of time. Most studies of the effects of repetition on
subjective duration have used a “temporal oddball” paradigm, in which participants see or hear a
sequence of repeated standard stimuli, with occasional presentations of a different “oddball” item.
The oddballs are judged to have longer duration than the standards (Tse et al., 2004). This effect
occurs with a wide variety of simple and complex visual and auditory stimuli and with a range
of temporal judgment tasks (Tse et al., 2004; Kim and McAuley, 2013; Birngruber et al., 2014),
although the effect has sometimes been exaggerated because researchers often choose oddballs that
are predominantly shorter in duration than the standards (Seifried and Ulrich, 2010).
The oddball task has several drawbacks: the novelty of the oddball is confounded with its
position in the sequence, participants are asked to compare a single oddball duration with the
duration of many standards on either side of it (such that the decision process is ill specified), and
the task confounds novelty on a given trial with the overall probability of occurrence across all trials
(Matthews, 2011; Birngruber et al., 2015a).
A simpler approach involves presenting two stimuli on each trial and having participants
indicate whether the second, target stimulus was shown for more or less time than the first
(a “reminder task”). On some trials the non-temporal properties of the second stimuli are identical
to those of the first (e.g., the same image is repeated); on other trials the second stimulus is novel.
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This approach de-confounds the target’s status as “novel” or
“repeat” from its position in the trial, and only requires people
to compare the durations of two items; it also allows the
experimenter to present completely new stimuli on each trial, so
that the repetition of a stimulus within a trial is not confounded
with its frequency of presentation across trials. The data from this
task replicate the basic repetition effect found in the oddball task:
repeated items are judged to last for less time than novel ones
(Matthews, 2011, 2015; Birngruber et al., 2015b).
The basis for repetition effects is unclear. The oddball effect
was initially attributed to attentional capture: novel stimuli
capture attention and were argued to thereby accelerate the rate
of information processing, which serves as an index of the passage
of time (Tse et al., 2004). One problem with this idea is that it is
the non-temporal properties of the oddball that capture attention
(e.g., its color or shape), and studies of attentional effects on
timing indicate that greater attention to non-temporal features
causes subjective time to contract rather than expand – putatively
because one “misses” pulses from an internal pacemaker when
one is not “attending to time” (e.g., Casini and Macar, 1997; Block
et al., 2010). A second proposal is that novel or rare stimuli are
more arousing than repeated ones and therefore accelerate the
rate of the putative pacemaker (e.g., Ulrich et al., 2006; New and
Scholl, 2009; for a recent discussion of related ideas see Wearden
et al., 2017). A third suggestion is that subjective duration is
positively related to the overall neural response evoked by the
stimulus – the “coding efficiency” (Eagleman and Pariyadath,
2009). Repeated items often evoke smaller responses (“repetition
suppression”; e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 2006), which in turn is
argued to underlie the contraction of subjective duration for
repeated items (Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2007, 2012; Schindel
et al., 2011; see Matthews et al., 2014, for a review). Finally, it
has been suggested that the temporal and non-temporal relations
between items generate expectations about future stimuli such
that less expected (i.e., novel) stimuli are detected faster and
therefore seem to last longer (Kim and McAuley, 2013).
These frameworks share the basic assumption that the
repetition effect arises because repeated stimuli are expected
whereas novel stimuli are unexpected. That is, they equate
repetition with expectation.
To test this core assumption, Matthews (2015) adapted an
approach used in studies of neural repetition suppression and in
investigations of priming effects (e.g., Bodner and Masson, 2004;
Summerfield et al., 2008). In these studies, each trial presents
two stimuli and the probability that the second is a repeat of
the first varies across blocks: in blocks with a high repetition rate
(rep-rate), the second stimulus is usually the same as the first; in
blocks with a low rep-rate, the second stimulus is usually novel.
The logic of this approach is that, if repetition effects arise because
repeated stimuli are more expected than novel ones, then making
the repeated stimuli even more predictable ought to increase the
strength of the repetition effect. That is, repetition effects will be
stronger in high rep-rate blocks than in low rep-rate blocks. This
result has been reported in several studies of neural repetition
suppression: the evoked response was smaller for repeats than
for novel items, and this suppression was greater in blocks where
repetition was common (e.g., Summerfield et al., 2008, 2011;
Larsson and Smith, 2012; Andics et al., 2013; Mayrhauser et al.,
2014).
However, Matthews (2015) found the opposite pattern for
timing responses: repeats were judged to last for less time than
novel stimuli, but this effect was reduced, eliminated, and even
reversed in blocks where the repetition rate was high. This argues
against the idea that the effect of repetition on subjective time
arises because repeated stimuli are more expected. Rather, they
indicate opposing influences of first-order repetition and second-
order expectations, with the former causing a compression of
subjective duration and the latter an expansion.
Similar results have since been reported by Cai et al.
(2015). These authors found that repetition compresses subjective
duration even when the repeated item is surprising. For example,
the authors presented regular sequences where the last item was
a non-repeat (e.g., A-B-A-B-A) and irregular sequences where
the last item was unpredictable but repeated the preceding item
(e.g., A-B-A-B-B). The last item was judged to have longer
duration in the former condition, indicating a compressive effect
of repetition that is stronger than any effect of expectation. Like
Matthews, Cai et al. (2015) argue that adaptation in the sensory
cortices underpins the repetition effect on time perception. In
addition, Cai et al. (2015) found that the compressive effect of
repetition was more pronounced when repeats were rare (20% of
trials), than when they were common (80% of trials) – mirroring
the result from Matthews (2015), and indicating that making a
repeat more predictable actually offsets the compressive effect of
repetition.
A similar conclusion is urged by recent work from Birngruber
et al. (2017), which found that explicit expectations about
forthcoming stimuli do indeed serve to expand subjective time.
These authors asked people to predict the color or shape of
stimuli immediately before they were presented; items that
matched the prediction were judged to last longer than those that
did not.
The present experiment provides a small addition to the body
of data regarding the dissociable effects of first-order repetition
and higher-order expectations. The experiment replicates the
approach of Matthews (2015), and had three aims. The first was
simply to generalize the findings of the earlier work by using
slightly different stimuli, testing equipment, and participants, and
with the data collected by a different researcher. The second was
to address a shortcoming in the design of the earlier studies. In
those experiments, the duration of the first and second stimuli on
each test trial were identical. This was to maximize participants’
uncertainty and thereby to maximize the effects of non-temporal
information (repetition and repetition rate). However, this
approach raises the possibility that the effect would disappear as
soon as there was genuine temporal information that could be
used as the basis for the participant’s response; alternatively, the
temporal information may interact with the effects of repetition
and rep-rate. Finally, the current study increased the number
of trials in the total session from that used in previous work.
Given the striking dissociation between the effects of rep-rate on
time perception and its effects on neural repetition suppression,
it will be important to examine both effects simultaneously by
collecting neural data whilst participants complete the temporal
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discrimination task. Such neuroimaging studies require a large
number of trials per condition, and the current experiment
provides a behavioral prototype for a task that could later be run




The experiment was approved by the University of Essex Faculty
of Biology Research Ethics Committee. Participants provided
written informed consent prior to starting the task.
Stimuli
The stimuli were 873 face images adapted from publicly available
face databases described by O’Toole et al. (2005), Ebner (2008),
and Burton et al. (2010). All images were edited to be 280 pixels
high (widths varied slightly depending on the proportions of the
face) and were presented on a uniform gray background). The
stimuli were presented on 60 Hz LCD monitors with a resolution
of 1920 pixels × 1080 pixels viewed from approximately 50 cm,
giving a vertical visual angle of approximately 7.9◦.
Design and Procedure
On each trial participants saw two faces, one after the other.
Their task was to judge whether the second face was presented
for more or less time than the first; they indicated their judgment
with a keypress. On repetition trials, the second face was identical
to the first; on non-repetition trials, the second face was novel.
The blocks alternated between high rep-rate blocks, where 75%
of trials were repetitions and 25% were non-repetitions, and
low rep-rate blocks, where 25% were repetitions and 75% were
non-repetitions.












Novel 567 600 15
Novel 633 600 15
Repeat 567 600 5
Repeat 633 600 5
Catch
trials
Novel 567 1200 3
Novel 633 300 3
Repeat 567 1200 1
Repeat 633 300 1
High rep-rate Test
trials
Novel 567 600 5
Novel 633 600 5
Repeat 567 600 15
Repeat 633 600 15
Catch
trials
Novel 567 1200 1
Novel 633 300 1
Repeat 567 1200 3
Repeat 633 300 3
The trial structure is shown in Table 1. Most trials (40
per block) were test trials, which involved a difficult temporal
discrimination: the first face was shown for 567 ms or 633 ms
with equal frequency, and the second was shown for 600 ms. The
remaining trials were catch trials, designed to detect inattentive
participants. On half of the catch trials the first face was shown for
633 ms and the second was shown for 300 ms; on the other half
the first face was shown for 567 ms and the second was shown for
1200 ms. The proportion of repetition and non-repetition trials
for each duration combination matched the current repetition
rate, as shown in Table 1. No faces were repeated across trials
(i.e., the first face on each trial was always completely novel).
Trial order within each block was randomized separately for each
participant.
The sequence of events on each trial was as follows: fixation
cross for 150 ms; black screen for a randomly selected interval
between 300 and 400 ms; first face; black screen for 300 ms;
second face; black screen for 2000 ms. Participants were
instructed to make their response during the 2-s response
window after the second face had disappeared.
Prior to the main task, participants completed eight practice
trials on which the first image was shown for 600 ms and
the second was shown for 300 ms (2 repetition trials and 2
non-repetition trials) or 1200 ms (2 repetition trials and 2
non-repetition trials); the practice trials used faces not used in
the main task.
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Essex
participant pool and took part for payment. The final sample
comprised 31 participants (12 male), ages 19–45 (M = 24.1,
SD = 5.6). A further 4 were excluded, 3 because more than
10% of trials were excluded due to timing errors or missed
responses, and 1 because she scored less than 80% correct on the
catch trials. Of the final sample, 16 of the participants started
with a low rep-rate block and 15 started with a high rep-rate
block.
RESULTS
On average, participants failed to respond within the response
window on 1.1% of trials.; trials with missing responses were
excluded prior to analysis. The mean proportion correct for the
catch trials was 96.8% (SD = 3.9%), indicating good engagement
with the task.
The analysis focussed on performance on the test trials. The
proportion of “longer” responses for each condition are reported
in Table 2 and were submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with
repetition rate (low vs. high), condition (repetition vs. non-
repetition), and the relative duration of the second stimulus
(shorter than first face vs. longer than first face) as within-
subject factors. There was a main effect of duration: as one
would expect, participants were more likely to respond “longer”
when the second face was shown for more time than the first,
F(1,30) = 42.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.584. There was also a weak
overall tendency for novel faces to be perceived as having longer
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1915
fpsyg-08-01915 October 30, 2017 Time: 13:57 # 4
Skylark and Gheorghiu Repetition, Expectation, and Subjective Time
duration than repeats, F(1, 30) = 4.99, p = 0.033, η2p = 0.143.
There was no main effect of rep-rate, F(1,30) = 0.887, p = 0.354,
η2p = 0.029, but rep-rate did modulate the effects of stimulus
repetition, F(1,30) = 18.52, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.382. Neither
rep-rate nor trial type interacted with stimulus duration, and
there was no three-way interaction [F(1,30) = 0.76, p = 0.390,
η2p = 0.025, F(1,30) = 3.01, p = 0.093, η2p = 0.091, and
F(1,30)= 1.54, p = 0.224, η2p = 0.049, respectively].
Given that duration did not modulate the effects of the
other variables, it is helpful to plot the results after collapsing
over duration (Figure 1), which clarifies the interaction between
rep-rate and trial type: when repeats were rare, the novel
faces were often judged as lasting longer than the repeats, an
impression confirmed by a follow-up paired t-test, t(30) = 3.99,
p < 0.001; when repeats were common, subjective duration
was essentially unaffected by stimulus novelty, t(30) = 0.55,
p = 0.585. Figure 1 also indicates that, across conditions,
there was a tendency to judge the second stimulus as being
shorter than the first. This effect may have been due to the
inclusion of long (1200 ms) comparison stimuli in some of
the catch trials, which could have increased the reference level
against which the target stimuli were judged (e.g., Morgan et al.,
2000) – but this speculative suggestion awaits future empirical
testing.
As an additional analysis (suggested by a Reviewer), we also
examined the effects of repetition on sensitivity. Our design
does not permit full psychometric curve fitting, so for each
participant we computed the proportion of hits (when the
second stimulus was correctly judged longer than the first) and
false alarms (when the second stimulus was erroneously judged
longer than the first) for each combination of repetition rate
and condition, and used these to calculate d’. (In one instance
the hit rate was zero and was replaced by 1/2N, where N is
the number of trials in that condition). The resulting mean
d’ values (with SDs in parentheses) were as follows: low rep-
rate, novel stimuli: 0.143 (0.169); low rep-rate, repeats: 0.132
(0.316); high rep-rate, novel stimuli: 0.255 (0.358); high rep-
rate, repeats: 0.110 (0.200). A 2 × 2 ANOVA indicated no main
TABLE 2 | Mean proportions of trials on which the second face was judged to last
longer than the first.
Rep-rate Condition Relative duration of
target stimulus
p (“Longer”)
Low Novel Short 0.436 (0.139)
Low Novel Long 0.489 (0.156)
Low Repeat Short 0.339 (0.159)
Low Repeat Long 0.389 (0.187)
High Novel Short 0.388 (0.170)
High Novel Long 0.478 (0.179)
High Repeat Short 0.396 (0.163)
High Repeat Long 0.436 (0.154)
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Rep-rate indicates the proportion of trials
on which the second face was a repeat of the first (low = 25%, high = 75%);
condition indicates whether the second face was novel or a repeat of the first.
Relative duration indicates whether the second stimulus was shown for more or
less time than the first.
FIGURE 1 | Repetition rate (rep-rate) modulates the effects of repetition. The
plot shows the proportion of trials on which the second stimulus was judged
longer than the first, as a function of rep-rate and whether the second
stimulus was a repeat of the first or novel. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals, calculated as described in Morey (2008).
effect of rep-rate, F(1,30) = 1.02, p = 0.321, η2p = 0.033, no
main effect of repetition condition, F(1,30) = 3.06, p = 0.090,
η2p = 0.093, and no interaction, F(1,30) = 1.49, p = 0.231,
η2p = 0.047.
DISCUSSION
These results replicate and generalize the findings of Matthews
(2015): novel stimuli were judged to last longer than repeated
stimuli only when repeated stimuli were relatively rare (and
hence presumably unexpected). When repetitions were common,
there was no difference in the subjective duration of novel and
repeated stimuli. The results from Matthews (2015) are therefore
not limited to situations in which the to-be-compared stimuli
have identical physical durations; indeed, the effects of repetition
and repetition probability on subjective time were independent
of the difference between the durations of the first and second
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stimuli, and we found no evidence that repetition or repetition
rate affect the sensitivity of temporal discrimination.
Like the results of Matthews (2015), the current data indicate
that the effects of repetition on subjective time are not due to
the repeated stimuli being “predicted” or “expected.” Rather,
the data suggest that first-order repetition compresses subjective
time through some other mechanism, such as low-level sensory
adaptation (Bruno et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2015), whereas
expectation expands subjective duration (Birngruber et al., 2017),
perhaps by improving the detection of the stimulus (Kim
and McAuley, 2013) or the extraction of information from it
(Matthews, 2015).
Several neuroimaging studies have found that repetition
suppression is more pronounced when repeats are common
than when they are rare (e.g., Summerfield et al., 2008, 2011;
Andics et al., 2013). Under the coding efficiency account of
time perception, the results of these imaging studies should be
mirrored in subjective time (Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2007;
Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009); that is, the repetition effect on
time perception should be more pronounced in high rep-rate
blocks than in low rep-rate blocks, which is the opposite of the
pattern found here. The present data therefore argue against a
simple relationship between the macroscopic evoked response
and the judgment of time (see also Benton and Redfern, 2016).
Indeed, recent imaging studies suggest that the neural correlates
of repetition and expectation are complex (e.g., Grotheer and
Kovács, 2014, 2015), and are anatomically and temporally distinct
(e.g., Todorovic and de Lange, 2012). The present data suggest
that these dissociable patterns of activity have distinct functional
consequences.
Our results can be accommodated within a broader theoretical
framework recently proposed by Matthews and Meck (2016;
Matthews and Gheorghiu, 2016). In this framework, which the
authors label the processing principle, subjective time is a positive
function of the strength of the percept, which refers to the ease
with which information can be extracted from the stimulus and
to the accompanying subjective vividness of the representation.
Specifically, the processing principle posits that “the processes
and variables that make a percept subjectively more vivid and
objectively easier to identify, categorize, and evaluate also make
it seem to last longer” (Matthews and Meck, 2016, p. 869).
Perceptual strength, and therefore subjective duration, depends
on the interplay of “bottom-up” and “top-down” processes.
Under this account, the compressive effect of repetition is just
one example of a variable that affects the effective strength of the
sensory signal; other relevant factors include sensory adaptation
(e.g., Johnston et al., 2006), modality (e.g., Jones et al., 2009),
and salience (e.g., Matthews et al., 2011). Likewise, the expansive
effects of higher-level expectations are mirrored by the effects of
working memory (e.g., Pan and Luo, 2012), directed attention
(e.g., Mattes and Ulrich, 1998), and long-term representations
(e.g., Witherspoon and Allan, 1985).
The processing principle predicts that subjective duration
is positively related to the ease with which information is
extracted from a stimulus, but is agnostic about the cognitive
or neural mechanisms that underlie time perception. Many
different models of timing, including pacemaker-accumulator
models (e.g., Zakay and Block, 1997), oscillator models (e.g., Gu
et al., 2015), state-dependent network models (e.g., Buonomano
et al., 2009), and drift-diffusion models (e.g., Simen et al., 2011),
are all capable of accommodating the effects of repetition and
expectation, but only by making post hoc assumptions about the
effects of these factors on some aspect of the timing process. A key
goal for future work will be the development of models in which
the effects of bottom-up and top-down influences emerge from
the model architecture, and which correspondingly generate new,
testable predictions about how the interplay of these variables
affects the perception of time.
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